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types of problems. Bayesian inference networks and state space 
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1. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Evidential reasoning refers to inference mechanisms by which 
the evidence provided by a set of indicators <findings, features, 
attributes, variables> is analyzed in order to gain better 
understanding of a given hypothesis, concept, situation, or 
phenomenon. Problem solving tasks of this nature include, for 
instance, medical diagnosis, , weather forecasting, corporate 
assessment, political crisis assessment, and battlefield reading. 
All of these problems share common characteristics in that the 
problem solver <PS> starts with an initial incomplete 
understanding of the situation (e. g. patient status> and based on 
his prior knowledge and expectations, he then looks for additional 
information that may reduce the uncertainty regarding the complete 
picture of the situation. Following a cyclic process, sources for 
additional information are identified, evaluated, and utilized, 
the new evidence is integrated into the existing knowledge base, 
the situation is reassessed and, if final assessments cannot be 
made, further information is requested. The process ends when the 
problem solver <PS> decides that he knows enough to form a 
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defensible interpretation of the situation, or that no additional 
sources of information can contribute significantly <compared to 
their cost> to remove the uncertainty which still remains, or 
temporal considerations force him to terminate information 
acquisition and assess the situation as best he can. 
Models for evidential reasoning and uncertainty management 
have attracted significant scientific effort since the beginning 
of the century. Classical probability theory, Carnap's and 
Hempel's confirmation theory, Shafer's evidence theory, and 
Zadeh's possibility theory represent a sample of such works. Many 
of the classical models were adopted and improved by artificial 
i ntelligence researchers who applied them in a variety of expert 
systems such as MYCIN <Shortliffe 1976), PROSPECTOR <Duda 1979> 
and MEDAS <Ben-Bassat 1980>. 
The purpose of this paper is to present a draft taxonomy of 
evidential reasoning problems and to propose a framework by which 
evidential reasoning models may be evaluated and compared. As a 
f rame of reference we propose models which are based on Bayesian 
<probabilistic> inference networks. 
2. PROBLEM AND KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION 
Bayesian inference Networks 
Problem and knowledge representation for evidential reasoning 
tasks may , be based on uncertain hierarchical inference networks. 
In such networks leaf nodes typically represent observable events 
<indicators) , while higher level nodes represent events 
<hypotheses> whose value <true, false or other> may be inferred 
from other nodes in the network; typically in lower levels but not 
necessarily. 
Formally, a node represents a multi-valued proposition in 
w hich the values are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. If this is 
not the case, we break the node into separate nodes each of which 
represents a set of mutually exclusive propositions. 
At any given point of time, we assign to each node a set of 
values that correspond to our degree of belief in the validity of 
the alternative propositions represented by that node. In Bayesian 
networks node values stand for the probabilities of the various 
alternatives corresponding to that node. 
A link between nodes Hi and Ej represents evidential 
r elevancy between the two corresp�nding events. Each link is 
assigned value <s> that represent the degree of significance for 
i nferring Hi from Ej or vice versa. In Bayesian networks a 
directed link that emanates from Hi pointing at Ej is assigned a 
matrix that represents P <e� 1 h�> for all of the possible values 
of Hi and Ej. By this formulation we are not commiting ourselves 
w hether the link represents a causal relationship 
<i. e. P <symptonldisease>> or a diagnostic relationship 
<i. e. P <disease j symptom> >. It is our experience, however, that in 
most cases eliciting causal probabilities is preferable. See 
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f <Ben-Bassat 1980> p. 150. 
medical diagnosis. 
for a discussion in the context of 
Once an observable node is reported its evidence is propagated 
along the network links and revises our belief in the validity of 
the higher level hypotheses connected to that node. In Bayesian 
networks, propagation mechanisms are based on Bayes theorem as the 
fundamental tool for probability revision, e. g. <Pearl 1986a). 
Node Categorization 
The hierarchical network structure suggests a categorization 
of the nodes into three main types. The leaf nodes typically 
represent events that can be perceived directly by the system 
sensors <the "eyes", "ears" and the keyboard). Higher level nodes 
typically represent events that are deduced by the system 
inference engine ("brain") . Root nodes represent the target 
hypotheses whose resolution is the ultimate objective of the 
system. Intermediate nodes may or may not be on the list of target 
hypotheses <see below> , and, in any case, we use them to form 
defensible argumentations of the resolution of higher level 
hypotheses. 
Several comments, however, are in order: 
1. An intermediate or top level node may sometimes be directly 
o bservable, but at a higher cost than inferring it from 
o bservable lower level indicators. For instance, opening. the 
a bdomen <explorative laparotomy> provides direct observation 
on events that we initially attempt to deduce from less 
expensive observations. 
2. We may sometimes wish to bypass low level nodes and report a 
value directly into an intermediate or top level node. This 
value is not an observation but r.ather a deduction performed 
by an autonomous agent who is unable or prefers not to 
delineate the basis for his deduction by lower level nodes. An 
example would be a distributed military intelligence operation 
in which medium level officers report upward only their 
summarized assessments. 
3. An observable indicator may sometimes be observed with noise. 
In this case we report upward a set of probabilities that 
summarize our impression of the noisy observation with regard 
to the possible values of the node. An example would be a 
patient who does not respond unequivocally to a physician"s 
questions. 
4. Although the structure indicates that evidence is propageted 
bottom up; top-down and sideways propagation may sometimes be 
found very useful. In fact, an important feature of Bayesian 
propagation is that it permits propagation in all directions. 
State Space Representation 
Using this framework, we may represent evidential reasoning 
tasks by a state space formalism. The state of the system at any 
given stage is characterized by the current values on the network 
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nodes. For the initial state So we assign to all top l�vel 
hypotheses their prior probabilities. The initial values for 
intermediate and leaf nodes may be derived from their parents and 
the values on the links. Observable nodes that have not yet been 
o bserved are additionally assigned the value UNOBSERVED designated 
by "?" These nodes are candidates for direct observation to be 
suggested by the information acquisition process. 
From the goal state point of view, the network nodes are 
divided into target and non-target nodes. Target nodes represent 
hypotheses that need to be resolved by the end of the process. 
That is upon process termination we need to make a commitment on a 
set of values - one for each target node - that jointly constitute 
the best explanation for the existing evidence. 
The set of target nodes depends on the application. In some 
cases the only important decisions at the final stage are about 
the root nodes and decisions about other nodes do not lead to any 
o perational consequences. In these cases the goal state depends on 
the values of the root nodes only. 
In other casas the state of intermediate nodes impact the 
action plan <in addition to their role as mediators for higher 
l evel deductions> . For instance, in medical diagnosis of critical 
care disorders a node representing the state of SHOCK is an 
intermediate node. Yet, to device a treatment plan it is very 
important to know whether the patient is or is not in SHOCK. 
Optimal termination criteria and commitment rules are complex 
issues which are still in their infancies for probabilistic 
i nference networks. See however; <Ben�Bassat 1980b> and <Pearl 
1 986b> . An example of a simplified goal state for medical 
diagnosis is as follows: 
Sa: The values of the top level hypotheses<is> 
group of intermediate hypotheses are above 
thresholds. 
A more sophisticated state space formulation 
problems is presented by <Ben-Bassat 1985a> . 
and a selected 
or below certain 
of diagnostic 
Evidential reasoning is the process of transferring the 
network from its initial state So to a goal state Scs. The 
operators for this transformation are queries on the observable 
n odes. The objective of a control strategy <Ben-Bassat 1985b> is 
to reach a goal state in a cost-effective manner. 
3. TYPES OF EVIDENTIAL REASONING PROBLEMS 
Three main factors play a role in determining the difficulty 
of evidencial reasoning problems: 
1. Network structure <depth, width, loops • • •  ) 
Target nodes; their number and interrelationships among them. 
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3. Dependencies among observable nodes. 
In what follows we will describe several types of evidential 
reasoning problems based on the first two factors only. These are 
graphically illustrated in Figure 1 through Figure 6 where the 
following notation is used: 
ubservable node � 
target node () 
intermediate node () 
Case <a> 
One 
<Figure 1> 
set of hypotheses 
exhaustive. 
which are mutually exclusive 
Observations which are directly linked to the hypotheses 
and 
Case <a> is a representative of the well known classical 
Bayesian classification problem that has been extensively 
researched in statistics, decision theory and pattern recognition. 
Case <b> <Figure 2> 
One set of hypotheses which are mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive. 
Hierarchical tree-like inferential links. 
Reasearchers in behavioral decision theory refer to case (b) 
as cascaded inference; <Schum 1978>. <The example in Figure 2 was 
given by J. Pearl>. 
Case Cc> <Figure 3> 
Hierarchically structured mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
hypotheses 
Observations which are directly linked to groups of hypotheses 
at differet layers of the hierarchy. 
An example of case <c> appears in threat assessment of 
unknown objects. Some observable nodes may point directly into the 
root node that represents the general hypothesis whether the 
object is at all threatening or not. This hypothesis, however, 
represents several families of hypotheses concerning the various 
types of threats, each of which may, in turn, be subdivided into 
more refined classification up to point where each specific type 
of threat occupies a separate node. For each of the subfamilies we 
may have direct links from observable nodes and perhaps 
intermediate node. Obviously, if E provides evidence for a family 
H, then it also provides some evidence for all of the subfamilies 
of H. Gordon and Shortliffe < 1985) and Pearl <1986) deal with this 
problem. 
Case <d> <Figure 4) 
Multiple non-competing sets of hypotheses 
Observations which are directly link�d to the hypotheses. 
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Case d refers to a situation where several hypotheses · may 
co-exist simultaneously. In suet"• a case eve!:.y hypothesis Hi gets 
its own node with two possible values Hi and Hi. The problem is 
also known as multi-membership classification in the context of 
pattern recognition <Ben-Bassat 1980b> , and was recently addressed 
by \Pearl 1986c> . 
Case <e> <Figure 5> 
Multiple partially competing sets of hypothesis 
Multi-link inferential chains without loops <singly connected 
g raph> . 
Case Ce> represents a situation of multiple causes for a 
given observation. The example presented in Figure 5 was discussed 
by <Kim and Pearl 1983>. The top level hypotheses are partially 
competing in the sense that "earthquake" reduces the liklihood of 
" burglary" by "explainig away" the alarm sound. 
Case (f) <Figure 6) 
Multi-perspective hierarchical reasoning 
<Target nodes distributed all over the network) 
In many applications, e. g. scene analysis, military situation 
assessment, we need to view an object or a situation from multiple 
perspectives in order to generate a rich description of it. For 
instance, in order to analyze a potential military attack 
< Ben-Bassat and Freedy 1982> we need to consider several 
perspectives: TYPE, THRUST, TARGET, TACTICS, DEPLOYMENT, etc. In 
each of these interrelated perspectives, the situation may be 
classified within one or more of the alternatives <states or 
classes> associated with that perspective. For example, an enemy 
attack can be one of the following TYPES: DELIBERATE, HASTY, 
SPOILING, or an AMBUSH. Similarly, there are several alternatives 
for THRUST, TARGET, TACTICS, etc. 
Within a given perspective several alternatives may co-exist 
simultaneously. For instance, within the THRUST perspective there 
is no reason to assume a priori that the enemy attack will consist 
of TANKS only or PARACHUTES only. Any combination of the possible 
alternatives, TANKS, AIR, MOBILE INFANTRY, PARACHUTES, HELICOPTER 
CARRIED I NFANTRY, may, in principle, be simultaneously true. 
The recognition process is to some extent "hierarchical" in 
the sense tt·.at l ow-l evel indications are used as the building 
blocks of higher level indications. For instance, information 
regarding the presence of trees, their height and density, are 
features that contribute to determine COVER and CONCEALMENT. 
Boulder size and soil type contribute to determine tank 
TRAFFICABILITY. Together they contribute to TERRAIN analysis. The 
results of TERRAIN analysis and other factors such as CAPABILITY 
contribute, in turn, to the determination of what TACTICS the 
enemy may choose, his DEPLOYMENT technique, and even influence the 
choice of a TARGET. 
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riGURE 6. ANALYSIS or MILITARY SITUATION ASSESSMENT 
INITIAL FINDINGS 
ACCUMUlATION & INTEGRATION 
HYPOTHESES 
GENERATION & EVALUATION 
GOAL(S) 
SETTING 
INFORMATION SOURCES 
EVALUATION & SELECTION 
Figure 7. 
FINDINGS SORTING BY 
GOALS & HYPOTHESES 
EV I DENCE 
INTEGRATION 
The cycle of evidential reasoning 
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The target nodes in this case are distributed all over the 
network because to device a battle plan we need to know the 
details of the arena and the enemy intentions, and not just 
whether or not he intends to attack. 
4. IMPLEMENTATION IN EXPERT SYSTEMS 
Expert systems for evidential reasoning problems should 
support the cycle through which human beings go in solving these 
problems. Our extensive experience with medical diagnosis, 
military situation assessment, electronic troubleshooting and 
other applications, suggest the following cycle which is 
illustrated in Figure 6. Experimental evidence supporting this 
description may be found in Eddy and Clanton <1982> Elstein et al 
<1978) and Zakai et al (1983). Military situation assessment will 
be used for illustrative purposes. Each step in the cycle 
represents one type of a decision problem, each of which may 
require different skills on the part of a human being, and 
different algorithms on the part of an expert system. 
<O> Initial Findings Accumulation 
The cycle starts with the presentation of an initial set of 
specific facts about the situation. These facts may have been 
observed in the field or they may have been passed to the decision 
maker, e. g. a 82 officer, through the command channels. They may 
have come from higher echelons, from parallel units or from 
subordinate units. They also include indications or responses to 
information requests that have been placed previously by the 82 
and collected by the various· information collecting agencies at 
his disposal. 
From thereon the process may be decomposed into the following 
steps: 
<1> Evidence Propagation and Hypothesis Generation 
The findings recently obtained are integrated into the 
existing evidence <which in the first iteration is the apriori 
information only) and trigger a moving chain of deductions 
pointing at several alternative interpretations in several 
perspectives of the battlefield. The uncertainty regarding the 
truth of these interpretations is updated, and as a result some 
alternatives may be verified beyond some threshold of condidence, 
others may be refuted <below some reasonable threshold of 
confidence> and still others may remain uncertain, though still 
feasible. At this point an attempt is made to see if the entire 
puzzle is clear, i. e. if the existing evidence explains the 
situation in each perspective of the battlefield, and a global 
interpretation of the situation may be drawn. Those aspects of the 
battlefield which remain unclear serve as the basis for deriving 
hypotheses to be worked up in the subsequent stages. The 
generation of a rich set of plausible hypotheses is the hallmark 
of a good situation assessor. 
<2> Goal <s> Setting for Attention Management 
Occasionally 
hypotheses may be 
of them may be 
need to be set on 
particularly in early stages too many 
triggered by the existing evidence, and not all 
simultaneously explored. In such a case goal (s) 
which attention will be focused in the next 
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immediate stages. These may include, for instance, 
verification/elimination of a specific hypothesis, or 
d ifferentiation between a group of competing hypotheses. Factors 
which affect goal determination include the severity and urgency 
of the candidate alternatives <i.e. enemy attack is expected 
w ithin 24 hours>, their present level of uncertainty and their 
initial apriori incidence. 
(3) Information Sources Evaluation and Selection 
Once a goal<s> is set, the information sources which may 
offer the findings by which this goal may be achieved need to be 
identified and evaluated. Such an evaluation is based, on one 
hand, on the potency <information content and reliability> of 
these information sources to achieve the determined goal, and, on 
the other hand, on the cost of utilizing them. This cost reflects 
not only financial, technical and logistic investments, but also 
the risk involved in getting the information. The information 
source<s> with the greatest expected contribution to the specified 
goal <s> compared to its cost is. then invoked , e.g. a 
reconnaissance aircraft. Frequently, a battery of information 
sources may be utilized simultaneously to permit deeper 
e xploration of a given hypothesis or concurrent exploration of 
several hypotheses. 
<4> Sorting of Evidence by Goals and Hypotheses 
As new findings come in, either as a result of the decision 
maker's request or "voluntarily", they should be sorted with 
regard to the entire battlefield structure including of course the 
t riggered hypotheses and, on the highest priority, with regard to 
the current goals. Nevertheless, findings should not be ignored 
just because they do not contribute directly to the current 
goal<s> or to the previously activated hypotheses. It is such a 
lateral thinking that may open new ideas leading to the generation 
of new hypotheses which may eventually turn out to include the 
correct ones. Goals need to be set in order to direct effectively 
the information acquisition path. However, once an indicator is 
observed, its significance should be analyzed with respect to all 
o f  its relevant alternatives. 
< 5> Evidence Integration 
Once all of the relevancy links of the new findings are 
identified, they are integrated with the existing findings and not 
just added to them. Recognizing dependencies between new and 
existing findings may prevent artificial compounding of redundant 
information. It may also suggest synergy, i.e. the evidence 
suggested by the group of findings is greater than the sum of the 
individual findings• evidence. At this stage we may also try to 
restructure the grouping of findings in an attempt to discover new 
possible interpretations. The new integrated evidence modifies the 
uncertainty of existing hypotheses and may suggest new hypotheses 
concerning the true situation. This completes the cycle and brings 
us back to stage <1> unless the termination test is positive. 
(6) Termination 
The situation assessment cycle may be interrupted or fully 
terminated under one of the following conditions: 
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<a> A decision may be reached with regard to the true 
situation in each aspect of the battlefield, all of the 
<suspicious) findings are explained by this 
interpretation, and no additional hypotheses are 
sufficiently triggered to justify further exploration. 
<b> Several triggered hypotheses have not yet been settled, 
however, the cost of removing the remaining uncertainty 
is relatively high compared to the expected information 
gain and the impact on the battle plan Cor treatment plan 
if medical diagnosis is the case). 
<c> New developments <e.g. sudden enemy attack) force the 
decision maker to terminate information acquisition and 
assess the situation as best he can with the existing_ 
evidence. 
<7> Integrated Summary Composition 
The situation assessment process culminates in the 
composition of the individual decisions made for separate 
battlefield aspects into one complete and coherent picture that 
leads to tactical planning. <This is what we called earlier the 
commitment decisions) The end result is the Intelligence Estimate 
document which is currently produced manually by the intelligence 
officer. 
5. SUMMARY 
We have presented several types of evidential reasoning 
problems and a detailed description of the Bayesian inference 
networks <BIN> approach for structuring these problems. The 
references cited in the paper provide a partial picture of the 
state of the art in Bayesian evidential reasoning. Much work 
remains to be done, however, recent developments and experience in 
this field suggest that the BIN-based approach is a powerful tool 
for practical expert systems. 
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